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I.

INTRODUCTION
What is interesting, and telling, about the Response Brief (Resp. Br) of

Respondent/Defendant Idaho Department of Commerce (“Department”) is that half of it is taken
up with extolling the virtues of the Idaho Reimbursement and Incentive Act (“IRIA”), which is
completely irrelevant to the constitutional issues presented to this Court. When the Brief finally
gets around to the real issues, the unconstitutional limitation on judicial review and the
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, it is unable to rebut the arguments set out in
Appellant’s opening Brief. Appellant Employers’ Resource Management Company (“ERMC”)
submits that the IRIA is unconstitutional and however meritorious the policy behind the Act, the
Court should find it to be unconstitutional.
As ERMC stated in its Opening Brief, it recognizes that courts presume the
constitutionality of statutes and that it bears the burden of showing the invalidity of the IRIA. See
State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709 (2011). This Court, however, also recognizes that
it has the obligation to uphold the state constitution by striking down legislative actions that go
too far. See, e.g., Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Manufacturing Co., 82 Idaho 337, 348, 353
P.2d 767, 778 (1960). ERMC submits that the Legislature went too far with the IRIA and
violated the constitutional separation of powers by granting the Department of Commerce
Economic Advisory Committee (EAC) and the Department improper judicial power and
legislative power.
II.

THE IRIA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT LIMITS JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Department’s response to ERMC’s argument regarding the IRIA’s intrusion into the

judiciary’s power misconstrues ERMC’s argument and appears to misunderstand this Court's
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previous decision. First of all, ERMC does not argue that this Court has already decided the
merits of this argument in its prior opinion, Employers Resource Management Co. v. Ronk, 162
Idaho 774, 71 n.3, 405 P.3d 33, 40 n.3 (2017). Rather, ERMC observed that several members of
the Court on their own during oral argument on the standing issue had raised concerns with the
IRIA’s limitations on judicial review of Department/EAC decisions. It is interesting that the
Department’s brief argues both (a) that this Court in its earlier decision did not deal with the
substantive merits of ERMC’s argument regarding judicial review and (b) that this Court did in
fact decide the substantive issue that competitors could challenge the EAC’s decision to approve
an application for tax credits despite the language of the statute. The Department cannot have it
both ways and presumably this Court cannot revise the language of a statute.
Neither does ERMC attempt to argue that all administrative agency decisions must be
treated as “contested cases" or that agencies are always required to make findings of fact.
Instead, ERMC has pointed out the fact that the IRIA has made EAC’s decisions virtually nonreviewable and thus insulated the agency from judicial review. It therefore gives “such finality
to the determinations made by the administrative agency thereunder that property and
constitutional rights of citizens may be conclusively determined without right to adequate
judicial review, " State v. Concrete Processors, 85 Idaho 277, 282, 370 9.2d 89, 94 (1963), and
therefore violates the Constitution.
As discussed in detail in ERMC’s opening brief and in the Department’s brief, the IRIA
simply contains a list of items that an applicant must discuss. The Legislature does not inform or
restrict the agency as to what weight any specific factor should bear. The language of the Act
provides that the Director of the Department simply ensures that the application discusses each
of those factors and then forwards the application to the Economic Advisory Council which is
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“given broad discretion to approve or deny applications for the IRIA tax credit." Ronk, 162 Idaho
at 776, 405 P.3d at 35. Under the IRIA, the EAC is not required to explain to anyone, including
the Director, how it reached its decision on the application or why it approved or denied the
application. It is not required to make findings of fact. Its consideration of an application is not
treated as a contested proceeding. There is no administrative appeal under the relevant IDAPA
rules.
The statute does provide that “an aggrieved applicant” can seek judicial review. Idaho
Code § 67–4739 (2). Of course, the question remains: if only “an aggrieved applicant” is
entitled to seek judicial review, and there is no contested case nor findings of fact and no
limitations on what the EAC can consider or whether or how the statutory list of factors should
be weighed, how can there be realistic judicial review? How can a court find that any denial of
an application is arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion under the Administrative
Procedure Act when the statute does not limit the EAC's discretion and there is no record to
determine whether a denial was arbitrary or capricious.
Perhaps more importantly, the statute attempts to restrict the courts' power of judicial
review except as to aggrieved applicants. The IRIA does not allow for judicial review by a
competitor of an approved applicant. The IRIA specifically excludes judicial review for anyone
other than an “aggrieved applicant." While this Court's earlier opinion does allow a competitor
such as ERMC to challenge the constitutionality of the entire statute because that statute
“unlevels the playing field,” there is no mechanism in the statute by which a competitor could
challenge the specific action of the Department and the EAC in granting a tax credit to a
competitor.
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Thus, judicial review of all of the decisions of the EAC under the IRIA is effectively
eliminated, in violation of the Idaho Constitution. The Department’s entire argument regarding
judicial review, either for aggrieved applicants or concerned competitors, rests on the fallacy that
there is anything to review under the statute. To the contrary, the EAC is a “black hole” both in
terms of any standards that it must comply with and in terms of the visibility of its process. The
Department argues that it has a variety of factors that it must consider (although not “weigh”)
when it considers what applications to provide to the EAC. It is telling to note that the
Department does not attempt to suggest how the EAC deals with the applications it receives from
the Department. The EAC does not issue findings of fact. It does not announce the basis for its
decisions. It does not appear to keep records of any deliberation that occurs regarding
applications. It does not explain why it denied the one application, even though the Department
had approved submission of that application to the EAC, presumably representing that all of the
statutory factors had been included in the application. There are simply no standards that the
EAC has to comply with and no basis on which a court could exercise judicial review. As
discussed below, the Act allows unfettered discretion not subject to judicial review.
III.

THE LEGISLATURE IMPROPERLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO THE
DEPARTMENT AND THE EAC
In Gundy v. United States (U.S. Supreme Court June 20, 2019, No. 17–6086), several

members of the United States Supreme Court indicated a willingness to reconsider the
“administrative state” under the non-delegation of legislative powers provisions of the United
States Constitution. ERMC in this case does not ask this Court to delve into the legal and
philosophical complexities of the general topic but simply asks this Court to recognize that the
IRIA violates the Idaho Constitution by delegating to the EAC the practical ability to grant tax
credits/subsidies. While there is a strong Idaho constitutional concern with the delegation of
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legislative powers in all matters, that concern is exacerbated when the topic is that of taxation
and particularly the allowance of exemptions. Idaho Constitution, Article 3, Section 1; Article
VII, Section 5 (“all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects [but] the legislature
may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as shall seem necessary and just").
This plenary authority of the Legislature is nondelegable.
While the United States Supreme Court's decisions regarding federal separation of
powers doctrine are not controlling, its decisions may help to illustrate the topic. As far back as
1928, the Court considered whether a statutory delegation is constitutional and agreed that it may
be, but only as long as Congress “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.” J.W.
Hampton, Jr., and Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). The constitutional question is
answered by review of the statute to see what instructions it provides. Woodland v. American
Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001). Chief Justice John Marshall explained in
1892 that Congress may not “delegate … powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative."
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the United States Supreme Court struck down a statute for violating
the separation of powers. That statute transferred to the executive branch the power to approve
codes of fair competition but offered no meaningful guidance. Justice Cardozo commented in a
concurrence that “this is delegation running riot." Id. at 553 (concurring opinion).
So too in this case of the IRIA is there “delegation running riot,” as there are no
meaningful standards to guide the EAC’s exercise of authority. The EAC is not implementing
the law but is making law without the necessity to conform to an intelligible principle mandated
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by

the Legislature. LC. §§

67-4739, 67-

4740. Therefore, the EAC does set terms for reimbursement and the Legislature requires the
Director to use these terms when entering the incentive agreement with the applicant.
The Department does not merely ascertain the existence of facts or conditions upon
which a tax incentive becomes operative. The Legislature did not provide guidance on how to
weigh the factors listed in the legislation or provide any other limits to the EAC’s discretion to
approve or deny applications. Because the constitutional standards for delegation of legislative
authority have not been met, the IRIA is unconstitutional.
IV.

IT IS IRRELEVANT IF THE POLICY IS BENEFICIAL IF THE STATUTE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Department spends a good portion of its brief arguing that the Legislature made a

wise policy or political choice in creating certain tax credits. It argues that the policy has “greatly
benefited Idaho as a whole” and helped Idaho “compete in the national and global market place."
(Resp. Br. at 2).
ERMC did not bring this lawsuit to debate the merits of these tax credits, although the
Court may wish to take note that there is some incongruity in the fact that the state is taxing
ERMC to fund tax credits for an out-of-state competitor, which creates an unlevel playing field.
Instead, ERMC is challenging the procedure and the process by which tax credits are
arbitrarily awarded and the process by which the judiciary is excluded from exercising its
constitutional obligation to review governmental decision-making. It is not the decisions per se
that emerge from the black hole of the EAC process; it is the arbitrary and mysterious process
that is effectively shielded from judicial review that is the issue before this Court.
The drafters of the Idaho Constitution wished to restrain the arbitrary exercise of
governmental power. That is why they implemented limitations on each branch of government
and provided for the separation of powers. That is why the decision-making process as well as
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hold that the IRIA violates the Constitution and the decisions of the Department and the
thereunder are void ab
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day 0f July, 2019.
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